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A ny analysis of the legality of using lachrymatories, napalm, and herbicides (defoliants) should not, in my view, be confined to determining their 
status under the 1925 Geneva Proto coli and customary international law. As I 
have urged elsewhere, we should concern ourselves with the future, not just the 
past? I will, therefore, attempt here not only to examine the existing law 
regarding these weapons, but also to look ahead to what this country's policy 
should be toward their use in armed conflicts. 
Lachrymatories 
CS,3 the modern-day lachrymatory or tear gas, is a sensory irritant that harasses 
and incapacitates by causing a copious flow of tears. While it may sometimes 
cause irritation, and even blistering, of the skin and, occasionally, nausea and 
vomiting, the symptoms will usually quickly disappear when the victim is 
removed from the contaminated area.4 The incapacity caused by tear gas is said 
to be "a temporary, reversible disability with few, if any, permanent effects.,,5 
It is used by most of the police forces of the world for domestic riot-control 
purposes.6 Its great advantage over older tear gases, and others currendy available 
such as CN, is the speed with which it incapacitates-about five seconds after 
exposure. CS is, of course, only a modern version of tear gas, which has long 
been available in other forms. 
Strangely enough, it may truthfully be said that the United States introduced 
the use of CS in hostilities in Vietnam for humanitarian reasons. One of the first 
uses ofCS, in September 1965, actually accomplished this purpose. A Viet Cong 
force was holed up in a tunnel. The United States commander believed that 
there were also quite a few civilian noncombatants, women, and children in the 
tunnel. He decided to use CS and succeeded in flushing out about four hundred 
people, including seventeen armed Viet Cong, without inflicting any injuries 
or causing any deaths? A second use ofCS that might be termed "humanitarian" 
was in helicopter missions to remove the wounded from the field of combat and 
to rescue downed fliers. In these cases the surrounding area was saturated with 
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CS in order to hold down small-arms fire against the helicopter during the course 
of its pickup mission. 
However, CS proved so effective for these purposes that its use was quickly 
extended to include numerous methods of delivery, both by air and on the 
ground, and many types of combat operations. Among the combat uses in 
Vietnam listed by various students of the matter are: 
Difensive operations: 
1. Defending perimeters (to repulse attacks on outposts and other fortified areas); 
2. Covering the removal of troops by helicopter (an extension to defensive 
combat operations of the original humanitarian purpose of removing the 
wounded and rescuing downed fliers); and 
3. Responding to the ambush of convoys (the ambushing troops, who, being 
unseen, were not good targets for small arms, were frustrated by the use of 
CS covering wide areas on both sides of the road). 
Offensive operations: 
1. Flushing the enemy from tunnels, caves, bunkers, fortifications, etc. (this 
considerably reduced the number of friendly casualties); 
2. Covering the landing of troops by helicopter (an extension to offensive combat 
operations of the original humanitarian purpose); 
3. Contaminating an area and thus denying its use to the enemy (while CS is not 
particularly persistent, during dry spells it can be stirred up by the movement 
ofa vehicle for some period of time); and 
4. Reconnoiterin§ enemy troop positions (CS forced concealed troops to reveal 
their position). 
Thus we find CS not being employed for humanitarian purposes to reduce 
the number of casualties, particularly of noncombatants. Instead, it was being 
used in conjunction with small-arms and artillery fire and with high-explosive 
and antipersonnel bombs. The individual driven from his place of safety by the 
tear gas thus became the victim of the conventional weapon.9 One commentator 
bt:lieves that developing these uses for tear gas, far from having a humanitarian 
result, actually increased the number of casualties among noncombatants. He 
concludes that tear gas forced noncombatants from cover, exposing them to 
weapons from which they would otherwise have been protected.10 
Was there anything illegal about the use of these combat procedures? Only 
if there is some norm of international law, either contractual or customary, 
prohibiting the use of tear gas in international armed conflict. The questions that 
then arise are: Do the prohibitions of the 1925 Geneva Protocol include a ban 
on the use of incapacitating gases, such as tear gas? And, if so, ha~ this ban become 
Weapons of Warfare 193 
a part of customary international law, binding on nations such as the United 
States that were not parties to the Protocol during the hostilities? 
On both of these questions there is a sharp difference of opinion among the 
writers. There are those who believe that, because of the discrepancy in wording 
between the English and French versions of the Protocol,11 or for other reasons, 
tear gases such as CS are not included in the treaty ban.12 There are others who 
. . h h 13 are Just as certam t at t ey are. 
Even if one assumes that tear gases are included within the prohibitions of 
the Protocol, that, of course, merely establishes a contractual ban. It does not 
necessarily mean that there was a norm of customary international law binding 
on the United States, then not yet a party to the Protoco1.14 There is just as 
sharp a division of thought among the experts as to whether there is a norm of 
customarr international law prohibiting the use of tear gas in international armed 
conflict. 1 The positions taken in the writings on the customary law raise three 
questions that, in my view, remain unanswered. 
1. If the Protocol itself is so indefinite that many articles have been written 
interpreting it both as banning the use of tear gas in international armed conflict 
and as not covering incapacitating gases such as tear gas, how can it be said to 
constitute the basis for, or represent the codification of, a norm of customary 
international law on the subject? 
2. If there is a norm of customary international law banning the use of 
incapacitating gases, such as tear gas, in international armed conflict, what is the 
significance of the many reservations to the Protocol making the ratifications 
applicable only with respect to other parties to the Protocol? Are the reserving 
states not saying that they are free from any ban on the use of any gas, including 
incapacitating gases, in hostilities with nonparties? If they are not saying that, 
what are they saying in the reservations? 
. 16 17 3. What do wnters such as Lauterpacht and Stone mean when they say 
that the prohibition on the use of gas (which would presumably include tear 
gases) is binding upon "practically all States"? How can a rule of customary 
international law be binding only on practically all states? 
Setting aside the unresolved legal problems, what are the practicalities that 
have motivated nations and international lawyers to find that international law, 
by treaty and by rule of custom, prohibits the use in international armed conflict 
of a comparatively harmless gas such as CS?18 The answer appears to be that 
there exists a well-founded fear that unless all gases, including the incapacitating 
gases, are considered barred, nations will build up their production capabilities 
and their reserves and these will not be limited to incapacitating gases.19 This 
did, of course, occur.20 Furthermore, it is feared that if some gases are not 
included in the ban, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to draw a clear line 
between the lawful and the unlawful?1 If tear gases are allowed because of their 
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nonpennanent effect, why not, for example, a psychochemical that gives the 
victim temporary hallucinations, or a gas that painlessly immobilizes the victim 
for a number of hours? Finally, there exists the fear that any use of gas, even an 
agent that is generally admitted to be only tem~orarily incapacitating, will 
inevitably escalate into more extensive gas warfare. 2 We have seen that the use 
of CS in Vietnam started out with a narrow humanitarian purpose and expanded 
into a major operational combat weapon. While the escalation fortunately did 
not go any farther, that possibility was always present. 
On the basis of the available materials, I am frankly unable to say that the 
United States was bound during the Vietnam War by any rule of international 
law prohibiting the use of tear gas in international anned conflict. I am 
convinced, however, that morally and politically the United States would be 
well advised to adopt and follow a policy of self-denial. This country should 
adopt a policy of no first use of tear gas just as it has announced such a policy 
for other gases,z3 While the original use of CS in Vietnam may have had a 
humanitarian basis, the varied combat uses subsequendy adopted were actually 
antihumanitarian in nature and result. The United States has isolated itself 
politically in this area. It has also created the possibility that the use of tear gas 
in some future conflict will gradually escalate into full-fledged gas warfare. The 
advantages derived from the use of tear gas in Vietnam, even assuming that such 
use was completely in accordance with international law, were not worth the 
price that had to be paid. 
Napalm 
Fire has, of course, been used as a weapon since time immemorial. Military 
forces relied heavily on flamethrowers during World War I and even more so 
during World War II. Similarly, magnesium and white-phosphorous fire bombs 
were widely employed during World War II both in Europe and in the Far East. 
Napalm was first developed and used during World War n,z4 At no time 
during either world war did a substantial or authoritative voice challenge the 
legality of using fire as a weapon in international armed conflict. When napalm 
was used extensively for the first time, in Korea, cries of outrage were heard. 
But these protests came almost exclusively from the side whose troops were 
receiving it and were unable to reciprocate in kind. During the Vietnam War 
these protests grew in volume, and they had support from elements throughout 
the world. 
Napalm is a gelled gasoline. The word itself is an acronym for the two 
ingredients that were thought to constitute the thickener that is added to the 
gasoline to produce the gel. 25 It is an extremely effective weapon and 
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undoubtedly the most valuable incendiary now available. Napalm is greatly 
feared, and its use causes far more panic than other weapons. 
For these reasons, the United Nations Group of Consultant Experts on 
Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons stated that napalm should 
be classified with high-explosive weapons, rather than with asphyxiating or 
poisonous gases?6 Resolution XXIII of the International Conference on 
Human Rights, adopted in Tehran on 12 May 1968, contained a preambulary 
clause classifying napalm bombing with chemical warfare.27 This portion of the 
resolution was omitted from General Assembly Resolution 2444 (XXIII), which 
resulted from the Tehran conference. 
In a report to the International Conference of the Red Cross, held in Istanbul 
in 1969, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) noted that 
napalm is a weapon that "can be very effective, while remaining precise in its 
consequences"; and that "napalm and incendiary weapons in general are not 
specifically prohibited by any rule of internationallaw.,,28 Some members of 
the Group of Experts convened by the ICRC expressed the opinion that napalm 
falls within the coverage of the 1925 Protocol because it can cause asphyxia by 
air deprivation. Others" considered such an assimilation difficult" and concluded 
that it is the use to which the weapon is put that determines its legality.29 Napalm 
has also been condemned as causing unnecessary suffering in violation of the 
1907 Hague Regulations.3D 
I do not believe that, at present, there is any rule of international law that 
prohibits the use of napalm upon selected targets, but there is, as I have argued 
previously, a strong humanitarian basis for urging total prohibition?1 However, 
as a practical matter, a meaningful agreement probably will not be reached to 
ban a weapon as effective as napalm has proved itself to be. As an alternative, I 
concur in the proposal that the Secretary-General of the United Nations have 
prepared, with the assistance of qualified consultant experts, a report on napalm 
similar to the one on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons.32 Such 
a report would examine whether it is necessary to limit or prohibit the use of 
napalm in international armed conflict. If either of these types of action is agreed 
upon, the report would serve as a basis for drafting an international convention 
on napalm. 
Herbicides (Defoliants) 
Herbicides (defoliants) are agricultural chemicals that poison or desiccate the· 
leaves of plants, causing them either to lose their leaves or to die. When 
herbicides cause leaf fall, whether they kill the plant or not, they are known as 
defoliants. While the first actual use of herbicides in armed conflict was probably 
during the Vietnam War, they are far from a new weapon. In 1945 the United 
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States had already developed herbicides known as LN agents, which were stated 
to be effective against plants, but not injurious to animals or humans. Some 
consideration was given to their use against the gardens that supplied food to 
the Japanese military on Pacific islands that the Allied forces bypassed in their 
advance toward Japan. 33 But no such action was actually taken. Herbicides have, 
of course, had considerable use as weed-control agents. 
As in the case of CS, the passage of time brought about a major change in 
the nature of the use of herbicides in Vietnam. While the original use was to 
defoliate jungle growths in order to open up to view enemy infiltration routes, 
a number of other uses were soon found. Crop destruction subsequently assumed 
some importance, although it never displaced defoliation as the primary use.34 
By 1968 the extent of the use of herbicides was limited only by the availability 
of supplies?5 Some of the uses to which herbicides were put in Vietnam 
included: 
1 D J:. li . 'nfil' th· 36 . elO atmg enemy I moon routes-to open em to VIew; 
2. Defoliating friendly base perimeters-to prevent sneak attacks; 
3. Defoliating lines of communication, including river banks-to prevent 
ambushes; 
4. Defoliating enemy base areas-to make his troops move; and 
5. Destroying crops-to make the enemy divert his combat efforts to food 
procurement and supply.37 
Once again, there is a sharp division of opinion among the experts on the 
applicability of the 1925 Geneva Protocol to herbicides. Some believe that the 
Protocol includes a ban on antiplant chemicals. They concede that the evidence 
to support this finding is comparatively weak.38 Their strongest argument is not 
the legislative history, which they heavily rely upon. It is rather the practical, 
not legal, point that, as in the case of incapacitating gases, it is impossible to draw 
a clear line between what is prohibited and what is not. As a result, unless nations 
consider all herbicides as banned, the possibility of escalation is ever present.39 
Other writers find no prohibition in the 1925 Geneva Protocol or in 
customary international law against the use ofherbicides.40 They are particularly 
certain of this conclusion if defoliation has a valid military purpose and if crop 
destruction is limited to crops destined for consumption by the military.41 It is, 
perhaps, appropriate to note two arguments that have been advanced in support 
of this basic thesis. The validity of each has been attacked. 
The first is that because herbicides are widely used domestically to control 
weeds and other unwanted vegetation, the Protocol (and, presumably, 
customary international law) cannot possibly have been intended to apply to 
them.42 This argument is correctly met with the response that evidence of 
domestic use is irrelevant for these purposes.43 There is nothing to prevent 
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nations from banning the use as a weapon in international armed conflict of 
chemicals that may be permitted within the boundaries of many of these same 
nations.44 On the other hand, the weakness of this particular argument 
concerning domestic use of herbicides may not be relied upon to support the 
view that herbicides are within the reach of the Protocol or of customary 
international law. 
The second argument sometimes advanced against Protocol coverage of 
herbicides is that it could not have been intended to prohibit the use ofherbicides 
because their military use was unknown in 1925. This is challenged as being of 
no legal significance if the prohibition falls within the objectives that the parties 
were attempting to achieve by the Protocol.45 A similar reply was advanced 
long ago with respect to Protocol coverage of nuclear weapons. 46 I had difficulty 
in accepting this view in the context of nuclear weapons. It is equally difficult 
to support it in this context. The acceptance of such an interpretation could 
virtually convert a treaty prohibiting the use of certain gases in international 
armed conflict into a treaty banning war. Salutary as this result might be, I scarcely 
believe that a legaljustification can be found forit. And, of course, if the Protocol 
is inapplicable, it cannot represent the codification of a norm of customary 
international law outlawing herbicides. 
One of the major practical arguments advanced against the use of herbicides 
is ecological in character. The report of the United Nations group of consultant 
experts stated that there had been no scientific evaluation of the long-term 
ecological changes caused by herbicide spraying. They were able to estimate 
that twenty years will be needed to regenerate the mangrove forests along the 
river banks in Vietnam.47 Another scientist warns that "when we intervene in 
the ecology of a rwon on a massive scale we may set in motion an irreversible 
chain of events." One nonscientist writer in the field coined the word 
"ecocide" in asserting that a recent scientific study indicated that permanent 
damage had been done to "future generations [in Southeast Asia] and the very 
nature of the earth. ,,49 
The United States heeded the admonitions of the environmentalists and 
substantially phased out its herbicide-spraying program in Vietnam. When it did 
so, it sought acceptable substitutes that would accomplish the same missions. 
Two seemingly noncontroversial methods were adopted: plows that tore up the 
vegetation along roads and trails to reduce ambushes, and concussion bombs 
that, by exploding horizontally, destroyed vegetation without cratering. The 
environmentalists, concerned only with their "thing," attacked the use of these 
new technologies.50 Perhaps they will soon make the side effects of war so 
unpopular that they will succeed where the statesman and the international 
lawyer have long labored in vain-they will make it impossible for wars to be 
fought by denying all weapons to their military forces. 
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I am inclined to conclude that intemationallaw does not prohibit the use of 
herbicides so long as such use does not violate any of the general nonns of the 
laws of war. This means that the destruction caused by herbicides must have a 
valid military purpose and that a food crop that is sprayed has to be identifiable 
as being grown for the use of the military. However, this is a weapon the ultimate 
effects of which are not now really predictable. It is one that may cause a 
complete upsetting of the life cycle of a treated area. Ultimately, the use of such 
a weapon may be as destructive to mankind as a nuclear or biological war. It 
appears not only that the United States was well advised to phase out its use of 
this weapon, but also that it should cut off the supply to South Vietnam in order 
to eliminate completely the use of herbicides in that country. With its ratification 
of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, the United States has now taken the first step 
by voluntarily renouncing the first use of herbicides, with certain minor 
. 51 excepnons. 
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Addendum 
At the time that this article was written in 1970, the United States, after half 
a century, had finally ratified the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol although it was not 
yet in force for this country. However, many of the questions oflaw with respect 
to the use of the weapons referred to in the basic article continue to exist. 
Discussions of some of the developments in these matters will be found in the 
articles entided "Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Weapons" and 
"Prohibitions and Restrictions on the Use of Conventional Weapons" in the 
present collection. 
In 1976 the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted the Convention 
Ott the Prohibition oj Military or any Other Hostile Use oj Environmental Modification 
(better known as the ENMOD Convention). This Convention entered into force 
on 5 October 1978. The United States is a Party. 
